show that probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in a Savage setting without imposing expected utility by dropping Savage's axiom P2 (sure-thing principle) and strengthening his axiom P4 (weak comparative probability). Their stronger axiom, however, embodies a degree of separability analogous to P2. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using Savage's original axiom P4 and a weaker analog of Savage's P2.
Introduction
In subjective expected utility theory, an agent's preferences under uncertainty can be represented by the expectation of a utility function with respect to the subjective probabilities that represent the individual's beliefs. Savage (1954) axiomatized this in a setting of purely subjective uncertainty. Machina & Schmeidler's (1992) contribution is to provide axioms that continued to characterize beliefs by means of subjective probabilities, but neither assumed nor implied that risk preferences conformed to expected utility theory. In particular, they drop Savage's sure-thing principle (axiom P2) and strengthen his comparative-probability axiom (P4). They motivate the need to dispense with P2 by noting that \probabilistically sophisticated non-expected utility preferences" { for example, those that can accommodate the Allais paradox { do not satisfy P2.
All preferences over acts that satisfy the Machina-Schmeidler axioms, however, induce preferences over lotteries that respect rst-order stochastic dominance. We
show that any such preferences over acts must satisfy a weaker version of P2 we call the \two-outcome sure-thing principle" (P2 0 ), which indeed can be interpreted as a notion of stochastic monotonicity for acts. We show that the conjunction of P2 0 and
Savage's original weak comparative-probability axiom P4 is equivalent to Machina and Schmeidler's stronger comparative-probability axiom. Hence, relying on their result enables us to show that, imposing the original Savage axioms but weakening P2 to P2 0 guarantees probabilistic sophistication. the results of the current paper and those of Sarin and Wakker (2000) who also use ideas of stochastic monotonicity to obtain probabilistic sophistication.
Preliminaries: Machina-Schmeidler
Set Up. Let X be an arbitrary set of outcomes ( nite or in nite). Assume that uncertainty is described by a set of states, S. For any event E S, let E c denote its complement in S.
Let F denote the set of functions from S to X with nite range, i.e. F is the set of Savage acts. Furthermore, for any pair of acts f and g in F and any event E S,
] denotes the act in F formed from`splicing' and`recombining' the two acts f and g in such a way that h (s) equals f (s) if s 2 E, and equals g (s)
if s 2 E c .
Let % denote the individual's weak preference relation on F (where, as usual, denotes strict preference and denotes indi erence). With slight abuse of notation, x denotes the constant act h, where h (s) = x for all s 2 S. Hence we will write x % y if and only if [
Denote by L the set of probability measures on X with nite supports. We will refer to the elements of L as roulette lotteries or just as lotteries. For each x in X , let x denote the (degenerate) lottery that yields the outcome x with probability one.
Any lottery R in L may be expressed as a probability weighted mixture of degenerate lotteries, corresponding to the outcomes in its support: that is, R = P m i=1 p i x i , where p i = R (x i ) for each i = 1; : : : ; m. Let 1 (respectively, > 1 ) denote the partial ordering over roulette lotteries of weak (respectively, strict) rst-order stochastic dominance derived from %. It is de ned as follows: for any pair of lotteries
And R > 1 R , if, in addition, strict inequality holds for some z 2 X .
We shall refer to a preference relation de ned on L and denoted by L as risk preferences. We shall say the risk preferences satisfy stochastic monotonicity (with respect to %) if they respect the partial ordering of rst-order stochastic dominance, that is,
We say that a function V : L ! R is mixture continuous and stochastically monotonic if it is continuous in probability mixtures and
Furthermore, we say it is a ne if for any pair of roulette lotteries R and R in L, and any in (0; 1),
Subjective Expected Utility A preference relation % on F is said to admit a subjective expected utility representation, if there exists a unique subjective probability measure (:) over events and an a ne utility function U (:) on L such that, for all pairs of acts f = [x 1 on A 1 ; : : : ; x m on A m ] and g = [y 1 on B 1 ; : : : ; y n on B n ],
We follow Machina and Schmeidler's (1992) rendering of Savage's theorem. The following set of axioms is necessary and su cient for a preference relation to admit a Subjective Expected Utility representation.
1
Axiom P1 (Ordering): The relation % is complete, re exive and transitive.
Axiom P2 (Sure-Thing Principle) For all events E and acts f , f , g and h,
An event E is \null" if any pair of acts that di er only on E are indi erent.
Axiom P3 (Eventwise Monotonicity) For all non-null events E, outcomes x and y, and acts g,
Axiom P4 (Weak Comparative Probability) For all events A and B,and outcomes x x and y y,
Axiom P6 (Small Event Continuity) For all outcomes x and acts f g, there exists a nite set of events fA 1 ; : : : ; A n g forming a partition of S such that
, for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng .
The rst and last axioms are analogous to the standard ordering and continuity axioms in choice under certainty. The fth axiom simply requires the individual not be indi erent between all outcomes. The fourth axiom allows us to deduce from the agent's preferences over simple bets an induced relative likelihood relation over events. We shall see below that the third axiom is necessary for the induced risk preferences to satisfy rst-order stochastic dominance.
As Machina and Schmeidler observe, P2 may be viewed as being \expected utilitybased". That is, not only does it play a critical role in ensuring that beliefs can be represented by a unique subjective probability measure but it also entails that the induced risk preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern a ne utility function.
2 The aim of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) was to investigate whether it was possible to have the former and without necessarily entailing the latter.
Suppose we x a probability measure over events, then we can associate with
, that is, the lottery formed by taking the weighted average of the degenerate lotteries corresponding to the outcomes in the range of f .
Probabilistic sophistication means that there exists a unique subjective probability measure de ned over the set of events, such that the individual ranks any pair of acts only on the basis of the lotteries they induce through . Formally:
Probabilistic Sophistication A preference relation % on F is said to be probabilistically sophisticated if there exists a unique subjective probability measure ( ) over events such that for all pairs of acts f and g, if
If an agent is probabilistically sophisticated, we can construct her induced risk preferences as follows: for any pair of lotteries R and R , we set R % L R if there exists a pair of acts f % g such that R = R f and R = R g . Furthermore, if an agent is probabilistically sophisticated then knowledge of an individual's subjective beliefs and her risk preferences % L enables us to recover her entire preference relation over acts.
Assume that the agent's induced preferences over lotteries (her risk preferences)
can be represented by a (not necessarily a ne) function V (:). Then probabilistic sophistication (with respect to ) is equivalent to: 3 for any pair of acts f and g,
If we further assume that the agent's preferences satisfy P2 then her risk preferences would satisfy the independence axiom of expected utility theory and hence % L would admit an expected utility representation. Hence in their axiomatization of subjective probability, Machina and Schmeidler (1992) drop P2, but they need to strengthen P4.
Axiom P4* (Strong Comparative Probability) For all pairs of disjoint events A and B, outcomes x x and y y, and acts g and h,
Any probabilistically sophisticated agent whose preferences satisfy stochastic monotonicity must satisfy this axiom. For such an agent, the rst preference indicates (A) (B), which in turn implies the second preference.
Like Savage's P4, Machina and Schmeidler's P4* stipulates that the relative likelihood assessments of the disjoint events A and B are invariant to the prizes directly used in the bet. But Machina and Schmeidler's axiom is stronger. First, it applies directly to conditional relative likelihoods; in particular, to the relative likelihood of the events A and B conditional on the event A[B. Second, it imposes an additional invariance: these conditional relative likelihood assessments are invariant to the outcomes that obtain on the states outside of A and B. In Savage, both conditioning and this invariance are derived from P2 (the sure-thing principle). This suggests that weakening P2 in a suitable way should be su cient. We do this in the next section by weakening P2 to an appropriate concept of stochastic monotonicity for acts.
3 Probabilities via Stochastic Monotonicity.
We rst consider two implications of stochastic monotonicity for risk preferences, and then extend these ideas to preferences over acts. Let % L be a risk preference relation on the lotteries over X . Stochastic monotonicity for % L may be expressed in terms of basic substitution operations on lotteries. One basic substitution is to take an outcome in the support of a lottery and change it to a worse outcome. Stochastic monotonicity says we should prefer the lottery before this change.
Stochastic Monotonicity (I) For all x; y 2 X , all 2 (0; 1], and all R 2 L
Another basic substitution is to move a probability mass from a better to a worse outcome within the support of a roulette lottery. Again Stochastic monotonicity says we should prefer the lottery before this change. Put another way: if any two roulette lotteries di er only in the weight they assign to just two outcomes, the agent should prefer the lottery that puts the larger weight on the better outcome.
Stochastic Monotonicity (II) For any pair of outcomes x; y 2 X , if two roulette lotteries R; R 2 L have the property that R(z) = R (z) for all z = 2 fx; yg,
for all R ;R 2 L and 2 (0; 1].
Notice that, in expression (2), R and R di er only in the probability they assign to x and y. Similarly R + (1 ) R and R + (1 ) R and R + (1 )R and R + (1 )R also di er only in the probability they assign to x and y.
Furthermore R assigns more weight than R to the better outcome if and only if R + (1 ) R (respectively, R + (1 )R ) assigns more weight than R + (1 ) R (respectively, R + (1 )R ) to the better outcome. Both these stochastic monotonicity axioms resemble the independence axiom in that they preserve preference ordering under the substitution of (sub-)lotteries. But these axioms only involve lotteries that di er just on two outcomes. This is a considerable weakening in that all risk preferences that respect rst-order stochastic dominance satisfy both these axioms, regardless of whether or not they satisfy independence.
The two stochastic monotonicity axioms are equivalent if the risk preference % L is continuous. However, their analogs for acts are not equivalent, so we will impose them separately.
Savage's axiom P3 (eventwise monotonicity) is an analog of stochastic monotonicity (I) for acts. To see the analogy, let g = [z on E, z 1 on E 1 ; : : : ; z n on E n ].
Suppose the agent's probability assessments are given by . Then the terms [x on E; g on E c ] and [y on E; g on E c ] in the statement of the axiom reduce to the lotteries
, similar to the terms on the right side of expression (1) . Therefore, if a probabilistically sophisticated agent satis es stochastic monotonicity (I), she must satisfy P3 (eventwise monotonicity).
The following is an analog of stochastic monotonicity (II) for acts. It restricts the sure-thing principle to apply only if, other than for two outcomes, if one of the acts in question assigns an outcome to a state then the other act in question assigns that same outcome to that state.
Axiom P2
0 (Two-Outcome Sure-Thing Principle) For all events E, all outcomes x and y, and any acts f; f ; g and h, if for all states s and for every outcome z = 2 fx; yg, f (s) = z if and only if f (s) = z, then
To see the analogy to stochastic monotonicity (II), suppose the agent's probability assessments are given by . The implication trivially follows if E is null or its complement is null, so suppose (E) 
Hence the reduction of [f on E; g on E c ] is (E) R+ [1 (E)] R and the reduc-
is (E) R + [1 (E)]R . Now suppose that, in each state, f (s) and f (s) di er only if they assign the outcomes x or y. Then the`conditional' reductions R and R di er only in the probabilities they assign to x and y. Therefore, if a probabilistically sophisticated agent satis es stochastic monotonicity (II), she must satisfy the two-outcome sure-thing principle.
The following lemma provides a useful reformulation of the two-outcome surething principle.
Lemma 1 Axiom P2
0 is equivalent to the following statement: For all disjoint events A and B; outcomes x and x, and acts g and h, While the original formulation of P2 0 illustrates its relationship to P2, the above restatement exposes its close connection with P4*, which is the subject of the next proposition.
Proposition 2 A preference relation % satis es strong comparative probability (P4*) if and only if it satis es the two-outcome sure-thing principle (P2 0 ) and weak comparative probability (P4).
Proof. P4 is the restriction of P4* to A [ B = S and P2 0 is the restriction of P4* to y = x and y = x.
To show the if part, consider two disjoint events A and B, outcomes x x and y y, and an act g such that
From lemma 1, we have that We can now give an alternative characterization of probabilistically sophisticated beliefs, by replacing P4* with the conjunction of P2 0 and P4 in Machina and Schmeidler's (1992) representation result.
Corollary 3
The following two statements are equivalent:
(a) The preference relation % on F satis es ordering, the two-outcome surething principle, eventwise monotonicity, weak comparative probability, non-degeneracy and small event continuity.
(b) There exists a unique nitely-additive convex-ranged probability measure de ned over subsets of S and a non-constant, mixture continuous, stochastically monotonic function V on L, such that for all pairs of acts f and g in F is an agreeing probability measure for % l . Machina and Schmeidler (1992) observe, however, that the existence of such an agreeing probability measure does not guarantee probabilistic sophistication. Sarin and Wakker (2000) show that the following axiom is su cient to close the gap, and is also necessary if we require the risk preferences to satisfy stochastic monotonicity.
Cumulative Dominance (Sarin and Wakker [2000] ) f % g whenever fs 2 S : f (s) % xg % l fs 2 S : g (s) % xg for all outcomes x, where the preference between f and g is strict whenever one of the antecedent % l orderings is strict ( l ). (a) Probabilistic sophistication holds and the risk preferences satisfy stochastic monotonicity.
(b) P2* and cumulative dominance hold.
Thus, to obtain their representation result, Sarin and Wakker use a weaker version of our sure-thing principle together with cumulative dominance, which is closely related to the stochastic monotonicity of risk preferences. Recall that we also appealed to stochastic monotonicity to motivate our axioms. Proof. Assume that the preference relation % satis es P2* and cumulative dominance . Sarin and Wakker (2000) note that the restriction of cumulative dominance to two-outcome acts gives us P4. We will show that P2 0 holds by using its equiv- Below, we show that A % l B if and only if U (f; z) % l U f ; z for all outcomes z.
Cumulative dominance yields f % f if and only if A % l B, the desired statement.
To see that it is possible for a preference relation to satisfy both P2 0 and P4, but not cumulative dominance consider the following example.
Example. Let S = fs 1 ; s 2 g and X = fa; b; cg. Let u : X S ! R be a state dependent utility function de ned by the following payo matrix:
Since there are only two states, we can identify each act f with the vector (x 1 ; x 2 ) where x s := f (s). Consider the preferences % over these acts generated by V (x 1 ; x 2 ) := u (x 1 ; s 1 ) + u (x 2 ; s 2 ). Since these preferences are additive across states, they satisfy P2 0 (in fact, they satisfy P2). To show that they satisfy P4, rst notice that the constant acts are ordered a b c. Thus P4 is satis ed provided that (a; b) (b; a)
if and only if (a; c) (c; a), which indeed holds. The`more likely than' relation %ì mplied by these preferences is: S `s1 `s2 `; . Cumulative dominance requires in particular that if fs 2 S : f (s) % xg = fs 2 S : g (s) % xg for all x 2 X , then Eventwise monotonicity is a type of state-independence axiom. The intuitive appeal of cumulative dominance is that it compares acts by comparing the revealed likelihood of sets on which those acts yield outcomes`at least as good as' each constant act x.
When state independence fails (as in the example above), however, this intuitive appeal is undermined. Suppose an act yields an outcome y in a particular state.
Suppose the constant act y (i.e., the act that yields y in every state) is at least as good as getting x in every state. But, without state independence, it does not follow that getting y in this particular state is at least as good as getting x in that state.
In the example, the constant act b is indi erent to the constant act c, but getting b in state s 1 is strictly better than getting c in state s 1 (and vice versa for state s 2 ).
